SLO County supervisors violate campaign disclosure laws

In a nakedly biased attack, the Tribune accused candidate Lynn Compton of using a loophole to skirt campaign sign regulations after she “wrapped” a vehicle with an advertisement decal promoting her campaign. Caren Ray supporters have eagerly piled on to this ignorant and anti-Constitutional notion.

Let’s address this:

The U.S. Supreme Court in City of Ladue v. Margaret Gilleo (1994), struck down a city law prohibiting signs, writing that political yard signs are “a venerable means of communication that is both unique and important. … Especially for persons of modest means or limited mobility, a yard or window sign may have no practical substitute. … Even for the affluent, the added costs in money or time of taking out a newspaper advertisement, handing out leaflets on the street, or standing in front of one’s house with a handheld sign may make the difference between participating and not participating in some public debate.”

The extraordinary costs of advertising in a SLO County supervisor election are directly implicated by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court struck down Ladue’s sign ordinance because it prohibited an important and fundamental means of Constitutionally protected political free speech. Lynn Compton has an identical interest in getting her message out just the same as Margaret Gilleo in Ladue, Missouri. The Courts have stated that regulations making free speech cost-prohibitive are unconstitutional. Reaching 60,000 voters with a vehicle sign is cost-effective and constitutionally protected.

In Curry v. Prince George’s County (1999), a federal court invalidated a sign ordinance limiting the posting of political campaign signs to 45 days before and up to 10 days after an election, writing, “There is no distinction to be made between [this] and City of Ladue … When political campaign signs are posted on private residences, they merit the same special solicitude and protection established for cause signs in City of Ladue.

In Arlington County Rep. Cmte. v. Arlington County (1993), the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated a county law that imposed a two-sign limit for each residence. The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled in City of Painesville Bldg. Dept. v. Dworken & Berstein Co. (2000> that requiring the removal of signs within 48 hours after an election is unconstitutional as applied to posting signs on private property.

The Painesville Court wrote, “Although the Supreme Court has not considered the issue, the overwhelming majority of courts that have reviewed sign ordinances imposing durational limits for temporary political signs tied to a specific election date have found them to be unconstitutional.”

Recent court rulings have thrown out many, many ordinances designed to restrict the time, place, and manner of political free speech. Lynn Compton has a fundamental Constitutional right to display campaign messaging influencing voters.

PARKING ON PUBLIC STREETS

There is no question that municipalities have the right to (somewhat) regulate the manner and time of vehicle parking on public streets. Yet, there is no sign stating “PARKING OKAY, EXCEPT VEHICLES WITH SIGNS ON THEM”. Further, no local ordinance regulates signage on vehicles (and cannot due to lack of jurisdiction–see below). Lynn Compton can certainly do what every other individual and business in the county is entitled to do: advertise on their vehicles. Thousands of vehicles have advertisements on them. It’s not a “loophole”.

“LOOPHOLE” VERSUS JURISDICTION

The term “loophole” is often applied when a law fails to conceive of a particular situation that otherwise was intended to be regulated. A party exploits a “loophole” when they purposefully create the conditions necessary to evade the law.

In order for a “loophole” to exist, it would need to be shown that the legislative intent in adopting local sign ordinances was to include public streets. That is not the case locally. There is nothing in the history of our local ordinance adoption that indicates the intent was to regulate signs on vehicles.

“Jurisdiction” is a legal term applicable when a court, municipality or agency has authority to regulate. An example of jurisdiction is SLO City’s prohibition on smoking in public. However, travel in a vehicle is interstate commerce—a matter of federal jurisdiction. Hence, SLO City cannot prohibit smoking in a vehicle, even when driving or parked on city streets.

In the case of Lynn Compton’s vehicular sign, there is no “loophole”, and there is no “jurisdiction”. Local municipalities do not have original jurisdiction over conduct related to vehicles, which is interstate commerce. And even if that were not true, Section 22507(a) of the Vehicle Code states that an “ordinance … shall not apply until signs or markings giving adequate notice thereof have been placed.”

Indeed, in Homes on Wheels v. City of Santa Barbara (2004), the Court spoke of Section 22507(a), writing (at p. 1179), “[A] motorist, unaware of the restrictions, county enter the City, park on a non-posted street and be cited. That is the classic trap for the unwary that the Legislature wanted to prevent.” That ruling was relied on to rule against the City of SLO in their homeless sleeping in cars fight (SLO Homeless Alliance v. City of SLO (2012)).

Lynn Compton was ignorantly attacked by the biased editors of The Tribune for doing what is legal, proper, and Constitutionally protected. She chose an effective and cost-efficient means of advertising her candidacy, thus serving the community need to have informed voters. Opponents—without any more basis than dislike—have tried to re-frame Constitutional political speech as a violation of the law… but even opponents recognize no law was violated, so they have resorted to innuendo and ad hominem and invoked poetic fallacy by improperly using loaded terms like “loophole”.